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CONVERGENCE IN RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SEVESO SITES
FROM ASSURANCE RESULTS TO ARAMIS METHOD
O. Salvi, B. Debray INERIS, France
1. INTRODUCTION
In thé SEVESO il Directive, thé objectives in terms of risk management are very
clear, but thé remaining question is: How to reach them ?
For example, there is no harmonisée! définition of thé scénarios that hâve to be
considered for risk assessment Typically, thé chosen scénarios (BLEVE, total loss of
containment, fire in thé largest tank, explosion of thé largest mass of explosive, etc.)
can be différent according to thé spécifie risk analysts and according to thé
deterministic or risk-based approach of thé country applying thé Directive.
In this présentation, I will share with you thé main results of thé ASSURANCE
project, in which 7 European organisations performed a benchmark exercise for thé
risk analysis of a spécifie plant. ASSURANCE pointed out thé need for further
development that were achieved in thé ARAMIS project. For this latter project, I will
présent thé main results and thé perspectives and how thé ARAMIS results
constitute a major step forward in thé convergence of practices in risk assessment.
2. ASSURANCE PROJECT
2.1 Project description
ASSURANCE means ASSessment of Uncertainties in Risk Analysis of Chemical
Establishments. This project was a benchmark exercise on risk analysis of chemical
installations to understand discrepancies between experts. The project consisted in
thé comparison of thé sélection of scénarios, thé comparison of thé estimation of thé
conséquences and finally thé comparison of thé estimation of thé probabilités. The
project lasted 3 years from 1998 to 2001. The 9 partners from 7 différent countries,
représentatives of thé risk assessment approaches implemented in Europe.
2.2 Main results
The partners used various risk analysis techniques and arrived at quite différent
conclusions with respect to thé sélection of thé scénarios, thé estimation of their
probabilities and thé estimation of their conséquences.
For example, in terms of probabilities, for a classical event which is thé "Rupture of 4
inch. pipe on a distribution Une", thé most optimistic partner estimated a probability of
occurrence at 3.4 . 10"8 per year, and thé most pessimiste partner at 2.3 . 10"4 per
year.
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Concerning thé conséquences of thé scénario, for a rupture in a pressurized tank,
thé distance to reach thé end point 6200 ppm in a normal atmospheric condition, was
estimated by thé most optimistic partner at 0,4 km and by thé most pessimistic
partner at 2 km.
Main results : Conséquences
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The last comparison concerned thé iso-curves for 10-5 / year that a person dies in
thé vicinity of thé plant because of an accident. There is a différence of about 800 m
between thé most optimistic and thé most pessimistic partners.
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2.3 Lessons learnt from ASSURANCE
The ASSURANCE project has shown that there are discrepancies between thé
experts in thé définition of scénarios considered for risk assessment. Some
assumptions are différent and thèse hâve a strong impact on conséquence
calculations.
There are also discrepancies in thé estimation of thé probabilities of some events
because there is a lack of reliable and contextual data (on failure rates, reliability...)
Moreover, thé project pointed out that risk curves mapping is not meaningful for local
authorities and thé public (consequence-based approach countries).
3. ARAMIS PROJECT
3.1 Project description
The ARAMIS project built further on thé conclusions of thé ASSURANCE project and
proposed a structured approach that reduces thé discrepancies in risk assessment.
The main objective is to build a methodology that will improve thé effectiveness of thé
safety reports required by thé Seveso 2 directive.
This method combines thé benefits from risk- and consequence-based approaches.
It will help operator to better demonstrate that hazards are identified and risks are
controlled.
Finally, it will provide appropriate information to base risk-related décisions like thé
deliverance of permit, lands use planning and emergency planning.
The project, which lasted from 2002 to 2004, consisted in thé élaboration of a
methodology givîng consistent ruies for thé identification of scénarios that take into
account mitigation devices and safety management, and being recognised by a large
number of risk experts from Compétent Authorities and from Industry, gathered in a
Review Team.
Project Overview
Risk = Frequency ® Severity ® Vulnerability
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In ARAMIS, thé risk level of an establishment is characterised with an integrated
approach where 3 independent parameters are quantified:
• thé Frequency of thé scénarios
• their Severity
• and thé vulnerability of thé environment
From thé risk analysis, Major Accident Scénarios are identified and then Référence
Accident Scénarios that take into account thé préventive measures implemented by
thé operator. The severity Sref and thé frequency Fref of thèse référence scénarios
are estimated.
The sélection of thé Référence Accident Scénarios is made possible thanks to thé
évaluation of thé efficiency of thé safety management System: both thé formai aspect
and thé safety culture within thé plant.
The environment vulnerability estimation describes thé sensitivity of thé potential
targets located in thé vicinity of thé SEVESO II establishments
The outputs of thé ARAMIS method are mainly represented on maps.
3.2 Main results
ARAMIS method is well structured and contents 6 major steps that are described
more extensively in thé main chapters of a user guide.
- Identification of major accident hazards (MIMAH)
- Identification of thé safety barriers and assessment of their performances
- Evaluation of safety management efficiency to barrier relîability
- Identification of Référence Accident Scénarios (MIRAS)
- Assessment and mapping of thé risk severity of référence scénarios
- Evaluation and mapping of thé vulnerability of thé plant surroundings
I will présent some key part of thé method to give an overview of its content.
The scénario identification
One of thé crucial step is thé scénario identification. It is based on thé bow-tie
approach where fault trees and event trees are connected through thé critical events.
The identification of thé scénarios consists in thé identification of typical and generic
events: direct causes (DDC and DC), necessary and sufficient conditions (NSC), thé
critical events (CE), thé secondary and tertiary critical events (SCE and TCE), thé
dangerous phenomena (DP).
This représentation enables then to identify thé safety functions and thé safety
barriers.
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The influence of safety barriers is determined in assessing their performances (level
of confidence, efficiency and time response in accordance with thé scénario).
The référence accident scénario identification
Then, a risk réduction goal, defined in terms of aggregated level of confidence, is
assigned to each scénario in order to reach an acceptable level of risk during risk
analysis. This phase use thé principles described in thé standard IEC 61508 on thé
évaluation of thé functional safety of safety instrumented Systems.
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Conséquence classes
At this stage, thé scénarios taking into account thé safety barriers are ranked in a
matrix. Those scénarios that are in thé yellow zone are considered as Référence
Accident Scénarios while thé scénarios in thé red zone hâve to be further worked out
to reduce their conséquences or their fréquence by implementing appropriate risk
reducing measures.
The barrier management performance
The barrier management performance combines a generic and a spécifie approach.
The method allows thé use of databases with generic levels of confidence. But 2
tools hâve been developed to assess thé specificity of thé studied plant:
- an audit protocol to assess thé barrier-related management activities
- and a questionnaire to assess safety culture/climate onsite
The barrier management performance reflects thé level of control of thé activities
relating to safety barrier life cycle.
Example
It is proposed to consider an example from thé paper industry taken from thé test
cases of ARAMIS.
The critical event is a runaway réaction that can be caused by thé introduction of an
excess of methanol in thé réaction, because of thé failure of a BPCS pump.
This runaway réaction will lead to an overpressure with an explosion and thé release
of chlorine dioxide, which is toxic.
In this example, we can estimate thé probability of thé dangerous phenomena if we
know thé frequency of thé initiating event and thé level of confidence of thé safety
barriers.
Example (paper industry)
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®2 conc. sensors + SIS + pump shutdown & close valve
• 1 PSH + SIS + shutdowns & emergency water tank
© 1 discharge vent connected to thé atmosphère
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The severîty calculation and mapping
The severity SCEÎ(CI) is estimated in every point in thé surrounding of thé plant for
each dangerous phenomena associated to ail critical events. Then, thé multiplication
of thé frequency by thé severity of each critical event is summed up to calculate thé
severity S(d) at a given distance.
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Thé vulnerability
The estimation of thé vulnerability of thé environment consists in an inventory and a
quantification of thé possible targets by using a Geographical Information System.
Three types of targets are considered:
- environmental targets
- human targets
- material targets
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The importance and sensitivity of thé targets was achieved by implementing a multi-
criteria decision-aiding method where thé ranking factors were elicited through
questionnaires distributed to a large number of experts.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The ARAM IS method has answered some of thé difficulties related to risk
assessment pointed out by thé ASSURANCE project.
Three project main conclusions can be drawn up.
ARAMIS method is based on thé safety barrier approach. This constitutes an
alternative to thé probabilistic/consequence based approaches which is well
understandable by thé industry as well as by thé compétent authorities. It is didactic
and pédagogie.
The safety barrier approach is also compatible with Layer Of Protection Analysis
(LOPA) method and thé IEC 61508 standard, which is largely implemented in thé
industry.
This approach leads to constructive discussions on thé level of performance of safety
barriers within thé plant and with thé authorities.
ARAMIS îs a method that takes into account thé specificity of thé plant, ifs safety
management System performance and its safety culture, when other methods
consider only generic data.
Beside thé development of an integrated risk assessment method, ARAMIS project
has achieved a tremendous exchange of practices between practitioners from more
than 15 EU Member States if we consider thé consortium and thé review panel.
This has led to a certain convergence among countries (partners and reviewers) in
thé way of implementing risk assessment in thé framework of thé Seveso 2 directive.
The project has brought éléments to fulfil thé need to establish a method that is
capable to assess thé risk level of an installation by integrating thé préventive
measures implemented by thé operators. Such a method is a prerequisite in order to
reach thé goals of thé SEVESO II Directive, that are to improve thé prévention linked
in particular with thé safety management. The application of this method results in a
more consistent risk évaluation and safety management strategy in ail European
Countries
This reflection has continued in thé European Working Group on Land Use Planning
(EWGLUP) which aims at exchanging expérience in risk assessment and land use
planning in ail Member States.
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